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Abstract 
 
A decrease in the reputation of a loan syndicate’s lead arranger, caused by a regulatory 
enforcement action for non-compliance with laws and regulations, disincentivizes potential 
syndicate participants from co-financing the loan. We formally argue that in such cases, the 
lead arranger must increase his share of the loan in order to make the loan sufficiently 
attractive to potential participants. We provide strong empirical evidence to support our 
theoretical argument, using the full sample of enforcement actions enacted on U.S. banks 
from 2000 through 2010 as well as syndicated loan-level data. 
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I. Introduction 
What reputational effect do regulatory enforcement actions, enacted on banks for breaches of 
laws and regulations, have on loan syndicate structure? In the syndicated loan market, a 
number of banks—namely, the lead (principal) arranger (lender) and the participants—form a 
syndicate to provide large corporate loans that a single bank cannot (or is unwilling to) 
finance alone. Global syndicated lending is a massive market, reaching US$4.7 trillion in 
2014 with nearly 10,500 transactions. In the U.S., the loan volume represents about 50% of 
the global volume, making the syndicated loan market the most significant source of 
corporate finance after the capital markets, especially for large firms. Regulatory enforcement 
actions enacted on lead arrangers impose an important reputational burden on these banks 
and may significantly affect loan syndicate structure. Our study is the first to explore the 
effects of the reputational burden of regulatory enforcement actions on loan syndicate 
structure. 
We begin by building a formal argument that links syndicate designer’s reputation to 
syndicate structure. Our setup includes three players: the lead arranger, the participant bank, 
and the borrowing firm. The interesting case occurs when the lead arranger and the 
participant decide to finance the firm’s project. After this decision, the lead arranger also 
decides how much costly monitoring effort to input. The participant has no way to observe 
the monitoring effort exerted by the lead arranger, implying incomplete information. We first 
show that, all else constant, the principal arranger’s optimal monitoring effort, and 
subsequently the project’s success, strictly increase with the lead arranger’s participation 
share. This relationship is quite intuitive, because a larger participation share makes a lead 
arranger care more about the project’s prospects and, hence, induces the lead arranger to 
invest more effort in its success. This part of our theoretical argument is in line with the 
empirical findings of Khalil and Parigi (1998), Kang et al. (2000), Lee and Mullineaux 
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(2004), Sufi (2007), and Ahn and Choi (2009) who, each in a different context, show that a 
bank monitors a firm more intensively when the loan amount to the firm is larger. 
 Importantly, a regulator audits the lead arranger and reveals a signal based on the lead 
arranger’s compliance with regulatory law on the books (Agarwal et al., 2014; Delis et al., 
2016). This signal relates to the presence, or absence, of an enforcement action, which 
becomes publicly available information. We consider that the participant bank bears a 
reputational risk by joining a syndicate designed by a punished lead arranger. According to 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) a reputational risk is “the current and 
prospective risk to earnings or capital arising from negative public opinion.” 
 Joint ventures with “problematic” business partners generate negative public opinion 
regarding a bank’s/firm’s financial future through a variety of channels (Dollinger et al., 
1997; Morrison and White, 2013). In the admittedly extreme, but still suggestive case of the 
Lehman Brothers’ failure, banks that were participating in syndicate loans with them during 
2008 suffered more in the period after their collapse (Ivashina and Scharfstein 2010). This 
was mainly due to the fact that these banks had to complement the Lehman Brothers’ share in 
existing credit-lines and, thus, to reduce the financing of new projects. In other words, joining 
a syndicate designed by a punished lead arranger (that is, by a lead arranger who is publicly 
perceived to be more prone to induce, maybe not extreme, but still significant costs to its 
collaborators) decreases a bank’s reputation as a reliable lender: the mere contractual 
association with a potentially problematic partner involves a non-negligible cost.  
 In the context of this argument, the described reputational risk should be proportional 
to the amount of the syndicated loan that is covered by the participant: the exposure of a 
participant to the threats that the lead arranger faces is increasing in the amount of the 
syndicated loan financed by the participant. Moreover, in a different context (software 
industry), Banerjee and Duflo (2000) show that entering in a contractual relationship with a 
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low-reputation firm, one should expect larger overruns (larger costs compared to those 
specified in the contract) compared to collaborating with a high-reputation firm. Hence, the 
mere signing of a contract with a low-reputation partner directly harms one’s business 
reputation as, in expected terms, it deteriorates one’s financial position. 
A punished lead arranger thus needs to further incentivize participant banks to co-
finance the project. To do so, the lead arranger must hold a larger share of the loan compared 
to the participants, essentially committing the arranger to a great deal of monitoring effort 
and, thus, to increasing the project’s success potential. Our solution to the game is a perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium, the comparative statics of which, with respect to the reputation 
component, suggest that an increase in reputational risk induces an increase in the lead 
arranger’s equilibrium participation share in the syndicate. By doing that, the lead-arranger 
provides incentives to herself to exert extra monitoring effort and thus to improve the success 
potential of the project. This informal, but nonetheless credible, commitment compensates the 
syndicate participants for the reputational risk that they undertake by collaborating with a 
punished bank and allow for the formation of the syndicate.  
We stress that our reasoning is in line both with the theoretical argument of Khalil and 
Parigi (1998) and with the empirical findings of Banerjee and Duflo (2000). The latter 
document that reputation plays a crucial role in shaping the incentives’ structure of signed 
contracts: low-reputation firms (that is, firms that are more likely to induce extra costs to their 
clients) sign contracts that provide them with more incentives to limit the total overruns (in 
our case, this is similar to improving the success potential of the financed project) compared 
to the contracts signed by high-reputation firms. 
 To summarize, our theoretical model predicts that the principal arranger’s optimal 
monitoring effort, and subsequently the project’s success, strictly increases with the lead 
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arranger’s participation share. Thus, a lead arranger with an enforcement action must hold a 
larger share of the loan to incentivize participant banks to co-finance the project. 
We empirically examine the validity of this argument using data from four different 
sources. Specifically, we use data on U.S. syndicated loans from DealScan, data for the 
borrowing firms from Compustat, data for the lead arrangers and participants from the Call 
Reports, and information on enforcement actions from a hand-collected dataset by Delis et al. 
(2015). Our data set spans the period 2000 through 2010. Looking at the summary statistics 
of our data, we observe that for syndicated loans originated prior to an enforcement action, 
the average lead lender’s share is 17%, the deal amount held by the lead lender is 
approximately US$79 million, the equivalent numbers following an enforcement action on a 
lead lender are 27%, US$101 million. 
 Our empirical model aims to establish causality running from the enforcement action 
to the structure of the syndicated loan. We examine the effect of a dummy variable that takes 
the value of one for loans originated within the first (or alternatively in the first two) year(s) 
after the enforcement action and zero otherwise on a number of alternative variables 
characterizing syndicate structure. More closely related to our theoretical model, we use as a 
dependent variable the lead arranger’s share of the loan. In alternative specifications, we also 
use as dependent variables a Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI) to analyze the concentration 
of holdings within the syndicate, the dollar amount held by the lead arranger, the dollar 
amount held by the lead arranger as a share of this lead arranger’s total assets, and the 
number of lenders participating in the syndicate.    
 Our identification method accounts for potential unobserved variables, especially the 
bank- and firm-level ones that might bias the coefficient estimates on the enforcement action 
dummy. Specifically, our dataset’s structure (cross-section of loans originated by the same 
lead lender in a specific year and across a number of years) allows us to explore a number of 
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fixed effects (bank, firm, year, loan type, loan purpose). Among these fixed effects, the bank 
and firm fixed effects are particularly important. In a pre-analysis, we show that using bank 
fixed effects to explain the enforcement action dummy within a specific period around the 
action, renders bank-level determinants that capture the reasons for regulatory action (e.g., 
capital and liquidity adequacy, asset quality, earnings management, inadequate audit systems, 
etc.) insignificant. Thus, bank fixed effects thoroughly control for the reasons the regulators 
impose enforcement actions and allow us to identify the (reputational) effect of enforcement 
actions on syndicate structure independently from these reasons. Similar arguments can be 
made for reasons stemming from firms or loan type, which we control for using the 
equivalent firm, loan type, and loan purpose fixed effects.  
 Our empirical results align completely with the theoretical model’s findings. 
Specifically, our baseline specification shows that an enforcement action enacted on a lead 
arranger increases that lender’s share by approximately 4.5 percentage points, a very large 
increase compared with the 19.3% average lead lender share in our sample. The HHI of the 
syndicate and the deal amount held by the lead arranger also increase considerably, and a 
relatively less significant decrease occurs in the number of syndicate lenders. Thus, we 
conclude that the main effect of an enforcement on the loan syndicate is that the participants 
require the punished lead arranger to retain a larger share of the loan. This result is aligned 
with the reputational impact of the enforcement action and the associated increased 
monitoring effort required from the lead arranger by the participants.  
Our results are robust to the use of sub-samples and model re-specifications. One 
important test is to focus on the set of loans in which the syndicate members (banks and 
firms) are repeated and, in addition to other controls and types of fixed effects, use lead 
bank*firm or firm*syndicate fixed effects. Importantly, these models control for the potential 
goal of lead arrangers to reduce their risk by lending to more prudent firms following the 
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enforcement action. By obtaining identification through loans given by the same lead bank 
(or same syndicate) to the same firm both before and after the enforcement action (and within 
the three-year time window), we limit the possibility that results are attributed to the lower 
risk-taking of lead banks following an enforcement action because the same firm is involved 
in the lending process. This also insulates our findings from a borrower-driven explanation of 
our findings. Last but not least, we control for alternative measures of reputation such as the 
market power of banks, to alleviate concerns that enforcement actions capture the effect of 
such measures. 
 We also show empirically that there are specific loan characteristics that moderate the 
positive effect of enforcement actions on the lead lender’s participation share. Evidently, loan 
characteristics aiming at lower informational asymmetries, such as the inclusion of collateral 
and guarantees, lower the positive impact of enforcement actions on the lead lender’s share to 
less than half of the equivalent of our baseline model. Similarly, the inclusion of performance 
pricing provisions in the loan contract, lowers the positive impact of enforcement actions to 
about half of the equivalent of our baseline model. Other loan characteristics, such as letter-
of-credit fees, covenants, and a previous lending relationship between the lead bank and the 
borrower, have less potent moderating effects. 
 Our paper is related to, but also quite distinct from, at least four strands of literature.
1
 
The most relevant studies examine the sources of loan syndicate structure. Sufi (2007) 
empirically shows that when borrowing firms require more-intense monitoring, the lead 
arranger retains a larger share of the loan and forms a more concentrated syndicate. 
Regarding the metric most relevant to our analysis, Sufi (2007) also shows a positive effect of 
the lead arranger’s reputation, as measured by lead arranger’s market share, on the loan share 
held by the lead arranger. Lee and Mullineaux (2004) and Jones et al. (2005) find that 
                                                 
1
 We do not intend to be fully exhaustive with respect to these three strands of literature and refer only to the 
most relevant studies for our analysis.  
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syndicates are more concentrated when the quality of information on borrowing firms is low. 
Gatev and Strahan (2009) analyze the effect of liquidity risk on syndicated loan structure and 
find that risk-management considerations matter more for participants than for lead arrangers. 
Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) use repeated syndicate members and bank ratings as measures 
of reputation and examine their effect on the origination or not of a syndicated loan.  
Beyond the important element that this study is the first to provide an explicit 
theoretical framework for the role of reputation in the syndicated loan structure, it also differs 
from the foregoing research because we focus on the reputational effects of enforcement 
actions. Notably, these actions are exogenous to borrowers and participant lenders, and they 
thus provide a case for the study of the effect of bank supervision on loan syndicate 
structures.   
 A second strand of literature analyzes the effect of enforcement actions on banks’ risk 
and performance. The most relevant study is that of Delis et al. (2015), who document that 
enforcement actions only moderately reduce the risk-weighted assets and non-performing 
loans ratios of punished banks, with no accompanying increase in the level of regulatory 
capital. Delis and Staikouras (2011) use aggregate data on the number of enforcement actions 
across countries and document similar results. Danisewicz et al. (2014) suggest that 
enforcement actions have adverse short-term effects on the macro-economy. Nguyen et al. 
(2016) show that both board monitoring is effective in reducing the probability that banks 
receive enforcement actions from regulators. A more dated literature (e.g., Brous and 
Leggett, 1996; Slovin et al., 1999) provides similar findings on the effect of enforcement 
actions on bank risk. 
 A third strand of literature concerns the setup and findings of our theoretical model 
within the framework of contract theory. In our model, the contract designer is the party that 
must exhibit the monitoring effort, and the participant contributes only part of the loan. This 
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model thus relates to studies that analyze potentially reversed principal–agent relationships. 
In the standard principal–agent framework, the principal designs a contract and the agent 
exerts a non-verifiable effort that affects both players’ payoffs (moral hazard). Hence, the 
principal introduces, in the contract, incentives for the agent to exert as much effort as 
possible. Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995), Kim and Wang (1998), and Demski and 
Sappington (1999) refer to many cases in which the principal must exert a costly effort that 
affects both players’ payoffs and, hence, must include in the contract clauses that provide her 
with the appropriate incentives in order to convince the agent that she will exert the desired 
level of effort. Indeed, as we show in the context of syndicated loans, these self-directed 
incentives of the contract designer can take a very intuitive form: The designer convinces the 
potential participants that she will exert the necessary monitoring effort by committing to 
finance a sufficiently large part of the project.  
 Finally, the tradeoff we establish between reputation and lead arranger shares has 
analogies in corporate governance more broadly. For example Calomiris and Carlson (2016) 
show that bank manager ownership is a substitute for formal corporate governance tools to 
ensure proper effort by the manager. In general, bank managers who have large stakes in their 
banks’ performance could exert greater effort in managing risk to preserve their own 
financial wealth (Demsetz et al., 1997; Laeven and Levine, 2009). Thus, the analysis 
conducted here for lead lender shares has a broad theoretical basis that goes back to at least 
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). 
 Our paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses our theoretical model and, 
based on its implications, specifies our testable hypothesis. Section III describes the empirical 
model and our identification method, followed by a discussion of the empirical results. 
Section IV concludes. 
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II. Reputation and Loan Syndicate Structure: A Formal Argument 
In this section, we formulate a theoretical argument that stresses the role of reputation of the 
lead arranger in the structure of a loan syndicate, with reputation emerging from a regulator’s 
decision in whether or not to enact an enforcement action. The set of players is given by {B, 
A, P}, where B is the borrower (firm), A is the lead (principal) arranger (the bank that designs 
the contract), and P is the potential participant (the bank that is offered the contract).
2
  
 The borrower wants to finance a project that costs one dollar but lacks funds. Hence, 
he requests financing from the principal arranger. The principal arranger might want to (i) 
lend the borrower the entire amount, (ii) partially finance the project herself, or (iii) not 
finance the project at all. In the first case, she provides a loan of one dollar to the borrower. In 
the second, she asks another potential participant to participate in providing the borrower a 
syndicate loan of one dollar. In the third case, she turns down the borrower’s loan application. 
If the loan (individual or syndicate) is approved, the lead arranger monitors the use of the 
borrower’s funds. 
 The timing of the game is as follows: 
Stage 1. The borrower applies for a loan of one dollar at a fixed interest rate, r, to finance a 
project. 
Stage 2. If the principal arranger does not want to finance this project at all, the game ends 
here. If the principal arranger wants to finance the project (even partially), the principal 
arranger writes a contract (𝑎𝐴, 𝑎𝑃) such that 𝑎𝐴 + 𝑎𝑃 = 1 and 𝑎𝑖 ≥ 0 for every 𝑖 ∈ {𝐴, 𝑃}. We 
use 𝑎𝑖 to denote the participation share of player i in the loan (the share of the loan that this 
player finances). Given that 𝑎𝑃 = 1 − 𝑎𝐴, we usually refer to a loan contract only by the 
share held by the lead arranger.  
                                                 
2
 We assume that an arbitrary number of potential participants provides no additional intuition to our analysis 
and only complicates formal arguments. 
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Stage 3. The potential participant observes the contract and decides whether or not to sign it. 
We consider a contract approved if the potential participant signs the contract. 
Stage 4. If the contract is not approved, the game ends here (no loan is given). If the contract 
is approved, the project is financed and the principal arranger decides how much monitoring 
effort to exert. 
Stage 5. The returns of the project are made public information. 
Stage 6. Players receive their payoffs. 
 The project’s success is subject to uncertainty. Formally, we assume that the project’s 
quality will be the outcome of a random draw from a uniform distribution on [0, s(e)], where 
𝑠(𝑒) = 𝑠 + 𝑒.3 Parameter 𝑠 ≥ 1 + 𝑟 can be viewed as the project’s inherent success potential, 
and it is assumed to be common information, while 𝑒 ≥ 0 measures the lead arranger’s 
monitoring effort. The larger the lead arranger’s monitoring effort, the larger the project’s 
success prospects. Therefore, a potential participant would like the principal arranger to exert 
as much monitoring effort as possible. We stress, however, that there is no third party that 
can enforce any level of monitoring effort, and hence the monitoring effort that the principal 
arranger will exert after the loan is approved cannot be part of the contract. This scenario 
represents a possible source of moral hazard, and the principal arranger must form rational 
expectations about it based on the information available to her.  
 If the project is financed and its quality turns out to be 𝛾 ≥ 1 + 𝑟, then the payoff of 
the borrower is 1, the payoff of the lead arranger is 𝑣(𝑎𝐴(1 + 𝑟), 𝑎𝐴) − 𝑐(𝑒), and the payoff 
of the potential participant is 𝑣(𝑎𝑃(1 + 𝑟), 𝑎𝑃) + 𝑎𝑃𝑞𝐴. In contrast, if the project quality 
turns out to be 𝛾 < 1 + 𝑟, then the payoff of the borrower is 0, the payoff of the principal 
arranger is 𝑣(0, 𝑎𝐴) − 𝑐(𝑒), and the payoff of the potential participant is 𝑣(0, 𝑎𝑃) + 𝑎𝑃𝑞𝐴, 
                                                 
3
 The uniform distribution is just an auxiliary device that greatly simplifies analysis and has no substantial 
implication on our findings. Indeed, what is vital for our results, is that the project's success probability is 
increasing in the monitoring effort of the principal arranger. The precise way that one chooses to model this 
outcome through a distribution is essentially inconsequential as far as the main structure of the underlying 
incentives is concerned. 
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where 𝑞𝐴 ∈ {−𝑞, 𝑞} for some 𝑞 > 0. To make the analysis easier to follow, we consider that 
𝑣(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑥 − 𝑦𝜉 , where 𝜉 > 1 and that 𝑐(𝑥) = 𝑥2. We stress though that all our qualitative 
findings are robust to more general formulations.
4
 
 The parameter 𝑞𝐴 approximates the characteristics of player A—and it is hence known 
to A—that affect the potential participant’s willingness to do business with A, but 𝑞𝐴 need not 
be known to the potential participant. When the potential participant is unaware of the 
particular value of 𝑞𝐴, we consider that she believes that its value is –q with probability ½ 
and q with probability ½. When there is no uncertainty, 𝑞𝐴 takes one of the two admissible 
values. This parameter can be interpreted as the reputational risk of doing business with A.  
 In this study, we closely link the lead arranger’s reputation with the regulator’s signal 
on the lead arranger’s compliance with regulatory law on the books. Specifically, if a 
principal arranger has recently been audited by the regulator and found to have engaged in 
legal or regulatory misconduct, then she receives an enforcement action that is publicly 
announced. It is then natural to assume that 𝑞𝐴 is known and takes the value –q. This implies 
that potential participants incur costs by forming loan syndicates with principal arrangers 
with bad reputations (i.e., those punished by the regulator).  
 On the other hand, when A has been audited and found to comply with laws and 
regulations, then 𝑞𝐴 is also known but takes the value q. This essentially implies that 
potential participants gain reputation by associating with principal arrangers with good 
reputations. Finally, when little is known regarding 𝑞𝐴, we can assume that the potential 
participant assigns equal probability to any of the two eventualities, which is identical to 
conducting business with a principal arranger of intermediate reputation.  
                                                 
4
 For example, we can replicate the analysis considering general forms of u and c—for our results to hold, it is 
essential that the lead arranger’s expected utility is strictly concave in the size of her share and that c is strictly 
convex in effort—without adding anything to the intuition that we obtain from analyzing the current 
specification. However, this exercise bears considerable cost in the complexity of formal arguments. 
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 Overall, we consider that reputational risk is proportional to the degree of association. 
If the potential participant contributes a small (large) amount to a loan designed by A, it 
undertakes little (great) reputational risks associated with this loan. This relationship is the 
reason why we multiply 𝑞𝐴 with 𝑎𝑃 in the payoff of P. 
 Because this is a game of incomplete (the monitoring effort exerted by the principal 
arranger is unobservable) and asymmetric (the principal arranger is better informed about 𝑞𝐴 
than the potential participant) information, the natural solution concept is a perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium (PBE). For a proper characterization of such an equilibrium, one should identify 
a profile of players’ strategies along with a consistent system of beliefs such that Bayes’ rule 
is applied whenever possible. To investigate how a PBE should look like in this framework, 
we start by focusing on the fourth stage of the game. 
 After a contract (𝑎𝐴, 𝑎𝑃) is approved in stage 3, the last decision of the game occurs in 
stage 4: The principal arranger decides how much monitoring effort to exert. Given our 
assumptions, therefore, at this stage the principal arranger solves the following problem: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑒≥0 {∫ [
1
𝑠+𝑒
(1 + 𝑟)𝑎𝐴] 𝑑𝛾 − 𝑎𝐴
𝜉
− 𝑒2
𝑠+𝑒
1+𝑟
}.   (1) 
Equation (1) simply amounts to the lead arranger deciding 𝑒 ≥ 0 in order to maximize her 
expected payoff, given that the contract (𝑎𝐴, 𝑎𝑃) was approved. Simple algebra establishes 
that, for any positive participation share on behalf of the principal arranger, 𝑎𝐴 > 0, there 
exists a unique interior solution 𝑒∗ > 0, which is characterized by 
2𝑒∗(𝑒∗ + 𝑠)2 = 𝑎𝐴(1 + 𝑟)
2     (2) 
and it is such that: 
𝜕𝑒∗
𝜕𝑎𝐴
=
(1+𝑟)2
(𝑠+𝑒∗)2(2+
2𝑎𝐴(1+𝑟)
2
(𝑠+𝑒∗)3
> 0.     (3) 
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Observation 1: All else constant, the principal arranger’s monitoring effort, and 
subsequently the project’s cumulative success potential, strictly increases along with the 
principal arranger’s participation share, 𝑎𝐴. 
  
 Observation 1 is quite intuitive, because the principal arranger has much greater 
incentive to improve the project’s success potential when she has financed a large part of it 
compared with when she holds only a small part of the loan. To study what happens in the 
contract design stage, we put forward a formal assumption regarding when the potential 
participant signs a proposed contract and when she declines. 
 
Assumption 1: We assume that the potential participant signs the contract if and only if her 
expected payoff from doing so is larger than investing the same amount of money in an 
outside option with success probability 𝑤 ∈ (0,1). 
 
 Taking into account that the only reasonable expectations regarding the monitoring 
effort that A will exert in the fourth stage of the game are uniquely defined for every 
admissible triplet (𝑠, 𝑎𝐴, 𝑟), the participation constraint of the potential participant is  
∫ [
1
𝑠+𝑒∗(𝑠,𝑎𝐴,𝑟)
(1 + 𝑟)𝑎𝑃] 𝑑𝛾 − 𝑎𝑃
𝜉
+ 𝑎𝑃𝐸(𝑞𝐴) ≥ 𝑤(1 + 𝑟)𝑎𝑃 − 𝑎𝑃
𝜉𝑠+𝑒∗(𝑠,𝑎𝐴,𝑟)
1+𝑟
. (4) 
All these suggest that a PBE of this game is characterized by a solution of the following 
maximization problem: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑎𝐴∈[0,1] {∫ [
1
𝑠+𝑒∗(𝑠,𝑎𝐴,𝑟)
(1 + 𝑟)𝑎𝐴] 𝑑𝛾
𝑠+𝑒∗(𝑠,𝑎𝐴,𝑟)
1+𝑟
− 𝑎𝐴
𝜉
− 𝑒∗(𝑠, 𝑎𝐴, 𝑟)
2}  (5) 
s.t.  
∫ [
1
𝑠+𝑒∗(𝑠,𝑎𝐴,𝑟)
(1 + 𝑟)] 𝑑𝛾 + 𝐸(𝑞𝐴) ≥ 𝑤(1 + 𝑟)
𝑠+𝑒∗(𝑠,𝑎𝐴,𝑟)
1+𝑟
    (6) 
or 
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 𝑎𝐴 ∈ {0,1}.       (7) 
 This maximization problem is well defined and hence always admits a unique 
solution—that is, we always have a unique equilibrium. When 𝑎𝐴
∗ = 0, no contract is offered, 
and when 𝑎𝐴
∗ = 1, the principal arranger finances the whole project (so approval of the 
contract by any other potential participant is unnecessary). Thus only the case in which 
𝑎𝐴
∗ ∈ (0,1) is interesting. Notice that the syndicate loan case 𝑎𝐴
∗ ∈ (0,1) is generic: When s is 
larger than 1 + 𝑟, but not excessively large, then the principal arranger wants to finance part 
of the project; and when w is sufficiently small, then the potential participant is willing to 
participate too. When 𝑎𝐴
∗ ∈ (0,1), the constraint could be binding or not.  
 The question of interest relates to the comparative statics of this solution with respect 
to a discrete variable, namely 𝐸(𝑞𝐴). Notice that 𝐸(𝑞𝐴) ∈ {−𝑞, 0, 𝑞} because either P knows 
the value of 𝑞𝐴—and hence we have either  𝐸(𝑞𝐴) = −𝑞 or  𝐸(𝑞𝐴) = 𝑞—or she does not, in 
which case we have 𝐸(𝑞𝐴) = 0. In other words, P either knows or does not know whether A 
has been subject to an enforcement action.  
 Consider first that 𝐸(𝑞𝐴) = 0 and that the solution, 𝑎𝐴
∗ , is such that the constraint is 
not binding. Then, 
∫ [
1
𝑠+𝑒∗(𝑠,𝑎𝐴
∗ ,𝑟)
(1 + 𝑟)] 𝑑𝛾 ≥ 𝑤(1 + 𝑟)
𝑠+𝑒∗(𝑠,𝑎𝐴
∗ ,𝑟)
1+𝑟
  (8) 
and the equilibrium contract, 𝑎𝐴
∗ , is characterized by 
𝑠 + 𝑒∗(𝑠, 𝑎𝐴
∗ , 𝑟) =
𝑎𝐴
∗ (1+𝑟)2
𝑎𝐴
∗ +𝑎𝐴
∗ 𝑟−𝑎𝐴
∗ −𝜉𝜉
.    (9) 
Intuitively, this case is not as interesting from a real-world viewpoint because enforcement 
actions are public information.
5
 
                                                 
5
 There are certain informal enforcement actions imposed on banks that are not made public, which we discuss 
below. One can also think of the special case where 𝐸(𝑞𝐴) = 0 as when participants only suspect that a 
principal arranger has been subject to informal action. 
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 So what happens if we keep everything constant but change the value of 𝐸(𝑞𝐴) from 
zero to –q? In that case, if the constraint is still satisfied when computed for the initial 
contract, 𝑎𝐴
∗ , then the equilibrium contract should remain identical to the initial one. This is 
because in such a case, the solution should coincide with the principal arranger's ideal 
contract, ?̂?𝐴 (understood as the solution of the principal arranger's unconstrained 
maximization problem). As we saw earlier, this ideal contract never depends on the exact 
value of 𝐸(𝑞𝐴). 
 Because 𝐸(𝑞𝐴) changes from zero to a negative value, however, it might be the case 
that the contract, 𝑎𝐴
∗ , is such that 
∫ [
1
𝑠+𝑒∗(𝑠,𝑎𝐴
∗ ,𝑟)
(1 + 𝑟)] 𝑑𝛾 − 𝑞 ≱ 𝑤(1 + 𝑟)
𝑠+𝑒∗(𝑠,𝑎𝐴
∗ ,𝑟)
1+𝑟
,  (10) 
which suggests that the new solution, 𝑎𝐴
∗∗, involves a binding constraint. In such a case,  
∫ [
1
𝑠+𝑒∗(𝑠,𝑎𝐴
∗∗,𝑟)
(1 + 𝑟)] 𝑑𝛾 − 𝑤(1 + 𝑟) = 𝑞
𝑠+𝑒∗(𝑠,𝑎𝐴
∗∗,𝑟)
1+𝑟
.  (11) 
 We notice that 
𝜕(∫ [
1
𝑠+𝑒∗(𝑠,𝑎𝐴,𝑟)
(1 + 𝑟)] 𝑑𝛾)/𝜕𝑎𝐴
𝑠+𝑒∗(𝑠,𝑎𝐴,𝑟)
1+𝑟
= (
1+𝑟
𝑠+𝑒∗(𝑠,𝑎𝐴,𝑟)
)
2 𝜕𝑒∗
𝜕𝑎𝐴
 > 0. (12) 
In other words, the constraint can switch from being not binding to being binding if and only 
if 𝑎𝐴
∗∗ > 𝑎𝐴
∗ . The intuition is clear: When the reputational risks increase because of the 
enactment of an enforcement action (𝐸(𝑞𝐴) jumps from zero to –q), a potential participant 
either still finds the principal arranger's initial contract, 𝑎𝐴
∗ , appealing enough to sign it or she 
refuses to sign unless the principal arranger increases the project's success probability and 
hence compensates for the extra reputational risk that P now undertakes. The only way that A 
can credibly commit to increasing the project's success probability is by taking a larger share 
of the loan herself, thus increasing her incentive to exert more monitoring effort after the 
contract is signed. Of course, if q is very large, then we could have that 𝑎𝐴
∗∗ = 0 (i.e., no 
contract is offered), because it might be impossible for A to propose a deal that is both 
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profitable for her and good enough for P to participate. But for non-extreme values of q, one 
should expect A to propose a contract with a strictly larger 𝑎𝐴.  
 Now consider that 𝐸(𝑞𝐴) = 0 and that the solution, 𝑎𝐴
∗ , is such that the constraint is 
binding. It is obvious that if we change the value of 𝐸(𝑞𝐴) from zero to –q, then it cannot be 
the case this constraint still holds for the same contract. The arguments presented above 
should make clear that in this case, the new solution, 𝑎𝐴
∗∗, is such that the left-hand side of 
Equation (11) is equal to q and, hence, 𝑎𝐴
∗∗ > 𝑎𝐴
∗ . Again, all these are conditional on q not 
being extremely large, because in such case we could have 𝑎𝐴
∗∗ = 0. Hence, again, the 
principal arranger reacts to a decrease in 𝐸(𝑞𝐴) by taking a larger share of the loan in order to 
commit herself to do more to improve the loan's success potential. 
 All the above hold for any decrease in 𝐸(𝑞𝐴), not just for changes from zero to –q. 
Symmetric arguments guarantee that an increase in 𝐸(𝑞𝐴) (for example, a change from zero 
to q) will cause A either to decrease the share of the loan that she finances or to leave the 
contract unchanged. 
 
Observation 2: All else constant, a decrease (increase) in 𝐸(𝑞𝐴) induces an increase 
(decrease) in the lead arranger’s equilibrium participation share in a syndicate loan. 
 
 Given the two observations and the fact that this game always admits a unique PBE, 
we have strong grounds to state the following testable hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis: Signed contracts designed by lead arrangers that pose reputational risks to their 
associates should be such that the lead arranger’s participation share is larger compared with 
the lead arranger’s participation shares in other signed contracts. 
 
20 
 
III. Empirical Model, Data, and Identification Strategy 
A. Empirical Specification and Variables 
To empirically test the hypothesis of our theoretical model, we use the following equation: 
𝑆 = 𝑎𝑓 + 𝑎𝑏
′ + 𝑎𝑙
′′ + 𝑎𝑡
′′′ + 𝑎1𝑃𝐸𝐿𝑏𝑡 + 𝑎2𝐹𝑓,𝑡−1 + 𝑎3𝐿𝑙,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑓𝑏𝑙𝑡.   (13) 
Table I defines the main variables used in the empirical analysis. Our sample includes only 
those lead arrangers that at some point during the 2000–2010 period received an enforcement 
action.
6
 In Equation (13), 𝑆 represents the syndicate loan structure. The variable of main 
interest is PEL (Post-enforcement loan), which is a dummy taking the value one for loans 
originated in the first (or alternatively the first two years) after the year 𝑡 of the enforcement 
action enacted on lead bank b, zero for loans originated in the year (or in the two years) 
before the enforcement action, and has missing observations for the rest of the loans (see also 
Table I). Thus, each regression is estimated for a three- or a five-year time window around 
the enforcement action. A positive value on 𝑎1 implies that once a lead arranger is punished, 
the structure of a syndicated loan in the year after the enforcement action changes so that the 
lead arranger holds a significantly larger share relative to a lead arranger without an 
enforcement action. 𝐹 and 𝐿 are vectors of firm and loan characteristics used as control 
variables. In turn, 𝑎𝑓 , 𝑎𝑏
′ , 𝑎𝑙
′′, and 𝑎𝑡
′′′ denote firm, bank, loan-type and/or loan-purpose, and 
year fixed effects, respectively, while u is the remainder disturbance.  
 [Insert Table I about here] 
 To estimate Equation (13), we combine information from four different sources. First, 
we obtain data for U.S. syndicated loans from DealScan. Following the literature (e.g., Sufi, 
2007), we measure the syndicate loan structure with several alternative measures. First, we 
use the share of the loan held by the lead lender, which is the dependent variable most 
                                                 
6
 We decided to restrict our analysis to this period because there are important banking regulatory reforms 
before 2000 (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 and other earlier ones) and in 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act of 2010) 
that clearly affect both the enactment of sanctions and the structure of syndicated loans. 
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directly relevant to the theoretical model. Two closely related variables are the (HHI), which 
shows the concentration of holdings within a loan syndicate, and the lead arranger’s 
exposure, which is the loan amount divided by the lead arranger’s total assets. Finally, we 
also examine the total number of lenders participating in the syndicate to explore whether 
average syndicate size decreases following an enforcement action on a lead arranger. 
 For the enforcement actions, we use the data set provided by Delis et al. (2015), 
which contains hand-collected information on formal enforcement actions between 2000 and 
2010. The information is obtained from the websites of the three main banking supervisors in 
the United States: the Federal Reserve System (Fed), the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC), and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).  
 In general, the supervisory organization conducts a full-scope on-site examination of 
each insured depository institution at least once every 12 months.
7
 This examination involves 
an audit procedure necessary to evaluate all components of the Uniform Financial Institutions 
Ratings Systems (UFIRS) or the CAMELS rating system assigned to each bank.
8
 The 
findings from the on-site examinations and CAMELS determine whether a formal or an 
informal enforcement action will be enacted. Informal actions are not disclosed to the public, 
so information on them thus is private and does not contain reputational risk. Such actions 
mostly are voluntary commitments made by a bank’s board members to correct problems and 
consist of commitment letters, memoranda of understanding, and approved safety and 
soundness plans. 
 When informal actions are inadequate to correct a problem, formal enforcement 
actions take place. These are legally enforced, more severe, and disclosed to the public. Thus, 
                                                 
7
 Different on-site audit frequencies can apply to banks that have been examined by the state authorities, to well-
capitalized and well-managed small banks, to banks in operation for less than five years, and to bank holding 
companies depending on their size and complexity. In our sample, most of the banks are large and are under 
relatively uniform inspection by regulators, most of the time involving the regulators maintaining offices inside 
the banks’ headquarters.  
8
 The components of CAMELS are capital adequacy (C), asset quality (A), management (M), earnings (E), 
liquidity (L), and sensitivity to market risk (S). 
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formal enforcement actions relate directly to reputational risk (Nguyen et al., 2015). Delis et 
al. (2015) group the formal enforcement actions according to their rationale into a number of 
groups, mostly reflecting the action’s severity. In most of our analysis we use all of the 
formal enforcement actions, because they should carry reputational risk weight, but we also 
demonstrate that our results are robust to including only those actions that relate to the 
financial safety and soundness of banks based on the Basel Committee Core Principles for 
Effective Banking Supervision (Basel, 2012). 
 We match information from DealScan and for enforcement actions with bank-level 
accounting data from the Call Reports and firm-level accounting data from Compustat. This 
matching process allows us to identify the accounting characteristics of banks and firms 
involved in the loan and to use these characteristics as control variables. We experiment with 
a very large number of control variables but ultimately select the following ones, which we 
find to be the most influential determinants of syndicate structure.
9
  
 At the firm level, we use a number of variables as proxies for “information opacity,” 
in the sense of the amount of publicly available information (Sufi, 2007). These variables 
include the debt ratings from Standard & Poor’s (firm opacity), firm size, profitability, book 
leverage, Z-score, cash flow volatility, asset tangibility, and the Tobin’s q ratio. Furthermore, 
we control for various loan characteristics such as the maturity and amount of the loan. 
Downgrading is a dummy variable equal to one if the loan is downgraded and zero otherwise. 
In a similar fashion, we use performance pricing, collateral, and relationship lending, which 
are also dummy variables, taking a value equal to one if the loan has performance pricing 
provisions, is secured with collateral, and the lead arranger has made a loan to the same 
borrower in the past five years before the current loan, respectively, and zero otherwise.  
                                                 
9
 We should note a priori that the inclusion of firm and bank fixed effects renders most of these control 
variables insignificant determinants of the syndicate loan structure. That is, the fixed effects are sufficient to 
capture the bank and firm characteristics affecting loan structure. Our empirical analysis illustrates this point. 
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 Finally, we experiment with many bank control variables but find that using bank 
fixed effects renders all such variables statistically insignificant. This result is intuitive, 
because the bank fixed effects collectively capture the reasons behind the enforcement 
actions and fully control for any related observed and unobserved characteristics, especially 
within the limited three-year window. 
Table II provides basic descriptive statistics for the full sample (Panel A), as well as 
for the main variables for the pre- and post-enforcement periods (Panel B). The summary 
statistics of Panel B are particularly interesting. They reveal a statistically significant 10% 
point difference in the lead lender’s share between the pre- and post-enforcement action 
period, alongside a considerably higher deal amount (US$ 22 million) held by the lead lender 
after the action, an 11% higher lead arranger’s exposure, a 9% higher HHI, and a lower 
number of lenders (3). In our empirical analysis, we aim to examine whether these effects are 
causal.  
[Insert Table II about here] 
 
B. Econometric Identification 
Our empirical model rests on the assumption that an enforcement action enacted on a lead 
arranger hampers the lead arranger’s reputation. In our context, we cannot imagine reasons 
for selection bias, because an enforcement action is not enacted in response to the structure of 
a specific loan or any other characteristic of that specific loan. Identifying the causal effect of 
an enforcement action on syndicate structure can be impeded, however, by omitted variables 
that the enforcement action dummy could capture erroneously. That is, specific bank 
characteristics or characteristics of the bank-firm relationship might be correlated with both 
the enforcement action and, independently, with the lead bank’s decision to hold a larger 
share of the syndicate.  
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 Our dataset’s structure provides a solution to this problem. We first note that the 
individual loan facilities are non-repeated but that lead lenders originate multiple loans within 
a year. On the one hand, this characteristic of our data set implies that enforcement actions 
are enacted at different times for different banks, and the inclusion of year fixed effects 
accounts for common shocks across all banks and firms (e.g., the effects of the subprime 
crisis). Further, the differences in the timing of the enactment across banks implies that the 
existence of a systematic omitted variable affecting both post enforcement loan and the 
structure of the syndicate is unlikely. Further, we can include firm fixed effects to capture 
unobserved firm-specific characteristics affecting the structure of the loan syndicate, and 
loan-type and loan-purpose fixed effects to control for the respective loan types (see Sufi, 
2007). 
 On the other hand, and quite importantly, the repeated observations on specific banks 
allow including bank fixed effects. The bank fixed effects are not perfectly collinear with 
post enforcement loan because they take the value one for a specific bank (and zero 
otherwise), whereas post enforcement loan takes the value one only after the year of the 
enforcement action. Our premise is that bank fixed effects almost fully capture the 
unobserved bank-specific characteristics that could render the effect of post enforcement loan 
endogenous. 
 To support this premise, we conduct a pre-analysis by estimating a model in which we 
regress post enforcement loan on the lags of a number of bank-year variables directly relating 
to components of CAMELS ratings (e.g., Flannery, 1998) and the Basel Core Principles for 
Effective Banking Supervision (Basel, 2012). Specifically, we estimate  
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑏𝑡 = 𝑑0 + 𝑑1𝐶𝑏,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑏𝑡,  (14) 
where C is a vector of important bank-specific time-variant variables. We use the ratio of Tier 
1 + Tier 2 capital to risk-weighted assets (risk-weighted capital) as a proxy for bank 
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capitalization; the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (non-performing loans) as a 
measure of credit risk; the ratio of loan-loss provisions to total loans (loan-loss provisions) as 
a measure for the quality of risk management; the Sharpe ratio as a measure for risk-adjusted 
earnings; and the ratio of liquid assets to total assets (liquid assets) as a measure of liquidity. 
To capture the systemic risk component, we use year fixed effects, and we also control for 
loan-purpose fixed effects to avoid attributing our results to specific types of loans.  
 We posit that a strong indication for robustness to endogeneity stemming from bank-
related omitted variables would be that the estimation of Equation (14) without bank fixed 
effects yields significant coefficient estimates on the variables in the vector C, whereas these 
estimates would become insignificant when we add bank fixed effects. Phrased differently, 
we aim to purify the reputational effect of enforcement actions on loan syndicate structure 
from bank characteristics that independently bear reputational effects. 
 We report the results from the pre-analysis in Table III.
10
 In columns I and III, we 
estimate the models without bank fixed effects, with the former model including only risk-
weighted capital and non-performing loans and the latter all bank characteristics. In line with 
expectations, we find that the enactment of an enforcement action is negatively correlated 
with higher capital, liquidity, and Sharpe ratios. The impact of loan-loss provisions is also 
negative but statistically significant only at the 10% level. In contrast, there is higher 
probability that post enforcement loan equals one for loans made by banks with higher non-
performing loans. 
[Insert Table III about here] 
 In columns II and IV of Table III, we introduce bank fixed effects, and all of the 
previously significant coefficients on the CAMELS-related variables become insignificant at 
conventional levels. This result is a strong indication that bank fixed effects control for the 
                                                 
10
 Our estimation method is OLS with high-dimensional fixed effects. Because of the large number of fixed 
effects required, maximum-likelihood logit or probit models have convergence difficulties.  
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reputational effects behind specific bank characteristics. We experiment with many other 
independent variables in these regressions, including other measures of credit and liquidity 
risk, other capital ratios, profitability ratios, proxies for off-balance-sheet items, sensitivity to 
market fluctuations, corporate governance (board) characteristics of banks, and so on. We 
find no significant changes in our results and thus conclude that when controlling for bank 
fixed effects, we significantly limit the endogeneity of post enforcement loan stemming from 
unobserved bank-level characteristics.  
 In even more restrictive specifications, we include bank*firm or firm*syndicate fixed 
effects. Bank*firm fixed effects control for the matching of specific lead banks and firms that 
could potentially include information for the lead bank-firm relationships in the formation of 
the loan syndicate. The firm*syndicate fixed effects refer to cases where the whole syndicate 
(and not just the lead arranger) are the same. These models further reduce the possibility that 
the observed increase in the lead lender shares and associated changes in other response 
variables is due to a reduction in the risk-taking of lead banks, materialized by lending to less 
risky firms following the enforcement action. The bank*firm (syndicate*firm) fixed effects 
allow obtaining identification through loans given by the same lead bank (same syndicate) to 
the same firm both before and after the enforcement action. Thus, this analysis limits the 
possibility that results are attributed to the lower risk-taking of lead banks following an 
enforcement action because the same firm is involved in the lending process within the three-
year time window. 
 
C. Baseline Empirical Results 
Table IV reports our baseline results. In all specifications, the effect of the enforcement 
action on various measures of syndicate structure in the first year after enactment is 
statistically significant at conventional levels (at the 1% level for the most important 
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dependent variables). The results in column I show that an enforcement action increases the 
lead lender’s share (the dependent variable most closely related to our theoretical predictions) 
in the syndicate by approximately 4.5 percentage points. For the lead lender with an average 
share (equal to 19.3% in our sample), this finding implies a very large increase of 
approximately 23.3%. Further, the results in columns II and III show that the amount held by 
the lead lender increases by approximately US$26.9 million (or 30.8% for the lead lender 
with an average deal amount), and the lead lender’s exposure increases by 4.6 percentage 
points. 
 [Insert Table IV about here] 
 A very similar picture appears when using as our dependent variables the HHI of the 
loan syndicate and the number of lenders. We find that an enforcement action increases the 
concentration of holdings within the syndicate by 3.8 percentage points or 21.5% for a lead 
bank with an average HHI in our sample. Concerning the number of lenders, we find a 
reduction of approximately 0.88 lenders following an enforcement action. This reduction is 
still statistically significant but economically smaller compared with the previous variables. 
Thus, although there is a decrease in the number of lenders that participate in a loan syndicate 
when the lead arranger receives an enforcement action, the most significant effect comes 
from the lead arranger taking up a larger share of the loan.  
The implications of our results are completely aligned with observation 2 and our hypothesis. 
Specifically, once a lead arranger is punished, the structure of the syndicated loan changes so 
that the lead arranger holds a significantly larger share, ceteris paribus. The main economic 
mechanism for this development must be that the enforcement action hurts the lead arranger’s 
reputation, so that the participant banks demand that the principal arranger hold a larger 
portion of the loan. With the larger share held by the lead bank, the participants are 
potentially less concerned with respect to the monitoring effort to be exerted by the lead 
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arranger and thus the project’s success. In Section D Below, we empirically dig deeper into 
this conjecture regarding the lead arranger’s monitoring effort.  
 For brevity and comparability, we report in Table A.I (Appendix) the results from 
specifications without any fixed effects as well as specifications where we sequentially add 
fixed effects. The model without fixed effects (column I) shows that the coefficient estimate 
on post enforcement loan is larger in magnitude compared to the results in Table IV. This 
confirms the fact that adding various fixed effects captures unobserved determinants of the 
syndicate loan structure and lowers the coefficient estimates to the levels observed in Table 
IV. We also find larger estimates when using models without fixed effects and the rest of the 
response variables (see Panel B of Table A.I). 
Our baseline results in Table IV are robust to a number of re-specifications and other 
robustness tests. We report the results only for the lead lender’s share, which is our main 
dependent variable, in Table V (for brevity we exclude the results on the control variables). 
First, in column I we use bank*firm fixed effects to control for time-invariant characteristics 
specific to the matching of specific lead banks and firms that might influence the structure of 
the loan syndicate. Moreover, in column II we use firm*syndicate effects (i.e., all the 
syndicate members, both banks and firms, are repeated). These are powerful tests for the 
effect of the enforcement action on lead lender shares because the results on post enforcement 
loan cannot be attributed to a change in the risk-taking strategy of lead banks (or syndicates) 
given that the borrower is the same firm within the three-year window. These models also 
exclude other unobserved borrower (demand-side) driven explanations of our findings. The 
results are equivalent to those of the baseline specification. 
In column III we restrict our sample only to participant banks with an enforcement 
action, in order to disentangle changes in the structure of the loan syndicates transmitted from 
participants to lead arrangers. This essentially is a placebo test for the potential effect arising 
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from the side of the participants. Evidently, the effect of Post enforcement loan is small and 
statistically insignificant, implying that enforcement actions on participant lenders do not 
play a role in the structure of the loan syndicate.  
Notably, three banks, namely Citibank, JP Morgan Chase, and Bank of America, 
dominate the market for syndicated loans. In column IV, following the approach of Bharath 
et al. (2011), we use the dummy variable Big-3 banks, which equals to one if the lead 
arranger is any of these three banks and zero otherwise. The coefficient on Post enforcement 
loan is 3.9% (significant at the 1% level). This result suggests that that the effect of 
enforcement actions on the lead lender shares is not driven by the top-3 banks.  
In column V we examine the sensitivity of our findings when we exclude loans for 
leveraged buyouts (LBOs) and for mergers and acquisitions (M&As). These loans present, in 
principle, more complete information because the syndicate has acquired private information 
about the borrowing firm from prior transactions (Ivashina and Kovner, 2011). Thus, we 
expect that the participant banks would be even more reluctant to fully engage in loans that 
exclude LBOs and M&As (i.e., the participants would require higher participation shares 
from the lead lender compared with our baseline findings). Indeed, the coefficient estimates 
on post enforcement loan are economically more significant when we exclude loans for 
LBOs and M&As, reflecting the importance of incomplete information in forming the effect 
of enforcement actions on loan syndicate structure. 
In column VI, we use a two-year window before and after the enactment of the 
enforcement action. The empirical findings and their implications are equivalent to those of 
column I of Table IV, although the economic significance is somewhat smaller (to be 
expected given the longer time frame of the window). Further, in column VII we use only the 
enforcement actions directly related to the guidelines of the Basel Committee Core Principles 
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for Effective Banking Supervision (Basel, 2012), which bear a higher reputational risk on the 
punished bank (Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2013). Again, changes in the results are minimal. 
[Insert Table V about here] 
 Moreover, our results do not change significantly (neither quantitatively nor 
qualitatively) when including bank-level controls (see column VIII) or when we control for 
alternative measures of market-based reputation for the lead lender (Sufi, 2007), such as the 
market share of banks (column IX), Lerner index (column X), and bank opacity (column 
XI).
11
 As we previously suggested, the inclusion of bank and firm fixed effects renders most 
of the equivalent control variables statistically insignificant, and the results very similar to 
those in Table IV.
12
 Our results are also very similar when we cluster the standard errors only 
by bank.  
 
D. The Role of Reducing Informational Asymmetries and Improving Monitoring 
Banks clearly want to avoid enforcement actions, but after they occur, a lead bank in a loan 
syndicate must deal with its reputation and the syndicate structure. The emerging question is 
whether there exists a strategy that a punished lead arranger can follow (or actually follows) 
to moderate the effect of the enforcement action on loan syndicate structure. An important 
issue in this respect is the alleviation of informational asymmetry problems among the 
participants, the lead arranger, and the borrower, so that the participant banks will perceive 
the loan as less risky. Further, there is a role of monitoring as related to Observation 1 of our 
model: Given the model’s assumptions, the lead arranger’s monitoring effort and 
participation share should be positively related. In a nutshell, we expect that loan 
characteristics related to lower informational asymmetry and increased monitoring effort (or 
                                                 
11
 We thoroughly define these measures in Table I. 
12
 The fact that risk-weighted capital and loan-loss provisions significantly determine the lead lender’s share of 
the loan does not imply endogeneity, because these variables do not affect post enforcement loan once we 
control for bank fixed effects, as illustrated in Table 3. We experimented with about 30 other bank and firm 
control variables and found most of these to be insignificant determinants of lead lender shares. 
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rather, increased monitoring efficiency in the empirical sense of these characteristics) might 
have a moderating effect in the positive nexus between enforcement actions and the lead 
lender’s share. 
 We first consider the role of securitization of loans with collateral. We expect that 
securitization will lower the effect of post enforcement loan on the lead lender’s share, given 
that informational asymmetry problems are more severe among unsecured loans than secured 
ones (e.g., Sufi, 2007). In column I of Table VI, we introduce an interaction term between 
post enforcement loan and collateral. Below the coefficient estimates we report the marginal 
effect of post enforcement loan for each specification. All specifications include the control 
variables of Table IV, although we do not report these estimates because of space 
considerations. We find that the use of collateral as a means of loan securitization lowers the 
effect of post enforcement loan to 1.35 percentage points (from 4.5 percentage points in the 
baseline specification). Similar moderating effects prevail when we use the rest of the 
dependent variables included in Table IV. 
[Insert Table VI about here] 
 Similarly, in column II of Table VI, we introduce an interaction term between post 
enforcement loan and guarantee. Loan guarantees play a similar role to collateral in lowering 
a loan’s riskiness in case of adverse developments for the borrower. The interaction term is 
negative and significant at the 1% level, and the marginal effect of post enforcement loan is 
1.23 percentage points. Further, in the third column of Table VI, we introduce an interaction 
term between post enforcement loan and letter-of-credit fee (in basis points). Again, the 
results show that the higher the letter-of-credit fee, the lower the effect of enforcement 
actions on the lead lender’s share. For a bank with an average letter-of-credit fee (equal to 
approximately 62 basis points), however, the reduction of the impact of post enforcement 
loan is not as large, with the marginal effect being 3.6 percentage points.  
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 Clearly, the lead arranger can significantly moderate the effect of enforcement actions 
on his loan share mainly by securitizing loans with collateral or by requesting a guarantee 
facility, indirectly passing the cost to the borrower. In a similar fashion, actions related to 
loan monitoring can moderate the effect of enforcement actions. To examine the role of these 
loan characteristics, we estimate an additional set of models, introducing interaction terms 
between post enforcement loan and variables that characterize loan monitoring. Specifically, 
we use information on (i) whether the loan has performance pricing provisions, (ii) the 
number of general loan covenants, and (iii) whether the lead arranger has lent to the same 
borrower in the last five years (see Table I for formal definitions of all of these variables).
13
 
 We report the results in Table VII. In all three specifications, the interaction terms 
between post enforcement loan and the variables related to loan monitoring are negative and 
statistically significant. The largest moderating effect in this set of models comes from the 
inclusion of performance pricing provisions, with the marginal effect of post enforcement 
loan being 2.54 percentage points (results reported in column I). The equivalent marginal 
effects for the models including interaction terms with general covenants and relationship 
lending are approximately 3.6 percentage points and 3.7 percentage points, respectively (see 
columns II and III). Thus, it is mainly the inclusion of performance pricing provisions, among 
the monitoring-related variables, that moderates an enforcement action’s effect on syndicated 
loan structure. 
 
IV. Conclusions and Extensions 
We study both theoretically and empirically the role of important regulatory enforcement 
actions, enacted on banks for breaches of laws and regulations, on loan syndicate formation. 
                                                 
13
 Clearly, a previous lending relationship can be considered both as an element of the bank-borrower 
relationship that lowers information asymmetries and as an element improving the capacity to monitor. We do 
not intend here to distinguish between the two attributes of relationship lending and we could have used this 
variable in Table V alongside the letter-of-credit fee (for a discussion of the importance of a relationship lending 
for lower letter-of-credit fees in syndicated loans, see Berg et al., 2015).  
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We first study a theoretical model with three players: the principal arranger, a participant 
bank, and the borrowing firm. The sequence of the game leads to the possibility that the 
principal arranger and the participant decide to originate the loan. Importantly, we link the 
quality (reputational) characteristics of the principal arranger with the regulator’s signal on 
the lead arranger’s compliance with laws on the books. The participant bank uses this 
information to decide on its participation share. Our solution to the game is a perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium, the comparative statics of which with respect to the reputation 
component suggest that an increase in reputational risk induces an increase in the lead 
arranger’s equilibrium participation share in the syndicate. 
 Subsequently, we match hand-collected data on enforcement actions with data for 
syndicated loans, as well as data for characteristics of the lead arrangers and the borrowing 
firms, and we conduct an empirical analysis to validate our theoretical findings. We show that 
loans originated by a principal arranger after an enforcement action have a significantly 
higher participation share by the lead arranger. According to our baseline specification, an 
enforcement action increases the lead lender’s share by approximately 4.5 percentage points, 
a 23% increase for the lead lender with an average share. The empirical results are very 
similar when we consider the dollar amount held by the lead arranger, the HHI of the 
syndicate, the number of lenders in the syndicate, and so on. 
 We further empirically show that this strong effect of an enforcement action can be 
mitigated, mainly by including collateral, guarantees, and performance pricing provisions in 
the loan contract. These decisions apparently ease participant lenders’ concerns resulting 
from the lower informational asymmetry and higher monitoring efficiency of these loan 
contracts, elements that significantly reduce enforcement actions’ reputational effects. 
 Our study opens up new avenues for research in the field of regulatory enforcement 
actions and/or syndicated lending. Two such avenues are particularly interesting. First, we do 
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not explore in this paper the effect of enforcement actions on syndicated loan pricing. On one 
hand, enforcement actions might trigger more-competitive pricing to prevent losing business 
in light of reputational effects. On the other hand, the banks might pass along the cost of 
enforcement actions to borrowers, especially if banks have some market power in niche 
markets and specific industries or strong relationships with specific firms.  
 Second, the reasons behind enactment of enforcement actions are potentially 
interesting. Examining the price and non-price terms of syndicated loans for punished lead 
banks vis-à-vis the price and non-price terms of syndicated loans enacted on lead arrangers 
with similar CAMELS ratings that did not receive an enforcement action, might highlight 
important effects stemming from differences between regulators, networks of banks, political 
connections, and so on. Such a study would be constrained by the fact that regulatory 
decisions for enforcement actions are to some extent discretionary, which is endogenous and 
difficult to measure. Because we have covered a lot of ground already in this paper, we leave 
these ideas for future research. 
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Table I 
Variable Definitions and Sources 
Variable  Description Source 
 
Dependent variables: 
Lead lender shares (%)  The share of the loan held by the lead lender. DealScan 
Deal amount held by lead ($M) The loan amount in $M held by the lead lender. DealScan 
Lead exposure (%) The amount of the loan held by the lead lender divided by the total 
assets of the lead lender. 
DealScan and Call 
Reports 
HHI (%) A Herfindahl–Hirschman index used as a measure of concentration 
of holdings within the loan syndicate. Higher values reflect higher 
concentration. 
DealScan 
Number of lenders The total number of lenders participating in the loan syndicate. DealScan 
 
Main explanatory variable: 
Post enforcement loan A dummy variable taking the value one for a loan originated by a 
lead bank in the year after a lead bank receives an enforcement 
action, a value zero for the loans originated by the lead bank in the 
year of the enforcement action or in the year before the enforcement 
action, and has missing values for the rest of the loans. This allows 
a three-year time window around the event. Alternatively, we also 
use an equivalent five-year window. The enforcement actions 
include all actions (penalties) enacted on lead arrangers for breaches 
of laws and regulations in a number of cases. These cases include 
laws and regulations related to the Basel Committee Core Principles 
for Effective Banking Supervision (i.e., capital adequacy and 
liquidity, asset quality, provisions and reserves, large exposures and 
exposures related to parties, internal control and audit systems, 
money laundering, bank secrecy, consumer protection, and foreign 
assets control). They also include breaches of the requirements 
concerning the fitness and propriety of banks’ board members and 
senior management, as well as other persons closely associated with 
banks (institution affiliated parties), and typical infringements of 
specific laws (e.g., Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, Flood 
Insurance Act, Flood Disaster Protection Act). 
Websites of FED, 
FDIC, and OCC 
 
Firm-level explanatory variables: 
 
Firm size The natural logarithm of total assets. Compustat 
Profitability The ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization to total assets. 
Compustat 
Book leverage The ratio of total debt on the books to total assets. Compustat 
Firm Z-score The firm Z-score equals 3.3A + 0.99B + 0.6C + 1.2D + 1.4E. A = 
earnings before interest and taxes/total assets; B = net sales/total 
assets; C = market value of equity/total liabilities; D = working 
capital/total assets; E = retained earnings/total assets. 
Compustat 
Cash-flow volatility The standard deviation of quarterly cash flow over the last five 
fiscal years prior to the year of the loan origination, divided by total 
assets. 
Compustat 
Tangibility The ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Compustat 
Tobin's q The natural logarithm of market-to-book value. Compustat 
Firm opacity Firms’ rating by Standard and Poor’s. Compustat 
 
Loan-level explanatory variables: 
 
Maturity The natural logarithm of loan maturity in months. DealScan 
Facility amount The natural logarithm of the loan (facility) amount. DealScan 
Downgrading Dummy variable equal to one if the loan is downgraded and zero DealScan 
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otherwise. 
Performance pricing Dummy variable equal to one if the loan has performance pricing 
provisions and zero otherwise. 
DealScan 
Collateral Dummy variable equal to one if the loan is secured with collateral 
and zero otherwise. 
DealScan 
Relationship lending Dummy variable equal to one if the lead arranger lent to the same 
borrower in the past five years and zero otherwise. 
DealScan 
General covenants The number of covenants in the loan contract. DealScan 
Letter-of-credit fee The fee charged for a letter of credit to be issued. DealScan 
Guarantee A facility backing the assumption of accountability for payment of a 
debt or performance of a person or entity obligation if the liable 
party fails to comply with expectations. 
DealScan 
 
Bank-level variables: 
 
Big-3 banks Dummy variable equal to one if the lead bank is Citibank, JP 
Morgan Chase, or Bank of America. 
Dealscan 
Risk-weighted capital The ratio of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital to risk-weighted assets. Call Reports 
Non-performing loans The ratios of non-performing loans to total loans. Call Reports 
Loan-loss provisions The ratio of loan-loss provisions to total loans. Call Reports 
Sharpe ratio ROA
σ(𝑅𝑂𝐴)
 , where ROA is the return on assets and σ(ROA) is the 
standard deviation of return on assets calculated over a five-year 
rolling window. 
Call Reports 
Liquid assets The ratio of liquid assets to total assets. Call Reports 
Market share The market share of each bank in the US market. Call Reports 
Lerner index 𝐿𝐼𝑏𝑡 =
𝑃𝑏𝑡−𝑀𝐶𝑏𝑡
𝑃𝑏𝑡
∗ 𝑊𝑏𝑡, where P is the price of bank output b at time 
t and MC is the marginal cost of the production of this output 
weighted by the share W of each bank in the syndicated loan. 
Marginal cost is estimated using a semi-parametric approach with a 
log-linear production function and bank output is measured by total 
earning assets. 
Own estimations 
based on data from 
the Call Reports 
Bank opacity Banks’ rating by Standard and Poor’s. Dealscan 
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Table II 
Summary Statistics 
The table reports summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis. The variables are defined in Table I. Panel B 
reports the t-test obtained from the difference between the means among groups.  
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
 
     Percentile distribution 
Variables Level Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 25th Median 75th 
Lead lender shares (%) Bank 5,406 19.319 19.856 8.333 12.500 21.277 
Deal amount held by lead ($M) Bank 5,406 87.259 184.520 23.333 40.590 83.333 
Lead exposure (%) Bank 5,406 17.185 18.841 7.143 11.111 20.000 
HHI (%) Loan 5,406 17.620 19.042 7.143 11.111 20.000 
Number of lenders Loan 5,406 11.671 10.629 5.000 9.000 15.000 
Post enforcement loan  Bank 3,444 0.178 0.383 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Post enforcement loan (2 yrs.) Bank 5,406 0.184 0.388 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Firm size Firm 5,406 7.454 1.675 6.305 7.372 8.569 
Profitability Firm 5,400 0.138 0.090 0.093 0.131 0.178 
Book leverage Firm 5,398 0.320 0.254 0.160 0.283 0.424 
Firm Z-score Firm 4,839 3.852 8.596 2.114 3.127 4.702 
Cash flow volatility Firm 5,400 0.044 0.030 0.027 0.038 0.053 
Tangibility Firm 5,406 0.294 0.229 0.117 0.232 0.427 
Tobin's q Firm 4,840 1.782 1.319 1.183 1.481 2.016 
Firm opacity Firm 5,406 15.101 6.443 10.000 14.000 23.000 
Maturity Loan 5,404 3.766 0.636 3.584 4.094 4.094 
Facility amount Loan 5,406 5.410 1.375 4.605 5.521 6.310 
Downgrading Loan 5,406 0.282 0.450 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Performance pricing Loan 5,406 0.573 0.495 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Collateral Loan 5,406 0.491 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Relationship lending Loan 5,406 0.509 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Guarantee Loan 5,406 0.114 0.318 0.000 0.000 0.000 
General covenant Loan 5,406 3.562 3.060 0.000 3.000 6.000 
Letter-of-credit fee Loan 5,406 62.080 96.274 0.000 0.000 112.500 
Big-3 banks Bank 5,406 0.297 0.457 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Risk-weighted capital Bank 5,405 0.013 0.084 0.088 0.097 0.013 
Non-performing loans Bank 5,405 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.011 0.007 
Loan-loss provisions Bank 5,405 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.005 
Sharpe ratio Bank 5,405 2.378 4.270 4.909 6.508 2.378 
Liquid assets Bank 5,405 0.016 0.027 0.029 0.038 0.016 
Market share  Bank 2,492 0.510 0.400 0.116 0.391 1.000 
Lerner index Bank 2,492 0.281 0.127 0.132 0.297 0.396 
Bank opacity Bank 4,875 5.030 1.048 4.000 5.000 5.000 
 
Panel B: Summary Statistics of Main Variables Before and After the Enforcement Action 
  
 
Post enforcement loan=0 
(A) 
Post enforcement loan=1 
(B) 
Difference 
(Mean) 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Median Mean Std. Dev. Median (B) – (A) 
Lead lender shares (%) 17.377 16.362 12.500 27.036 27.670 16.667 9.658*** 
Deal amount held by lead ($M) 79.209 166.328 38.889 101.443 259.470 44.722 22.234*** 
Lead exposure (%) 14.922 15.023 11.111 26.001 26.756 16.667 11.078*** 
HHI (%) 15.805 15.709 11.111 25.003 26.661 14.286 9.197*** 
Number of lenders 12.205 11.317 10.000 9.526 10.410 7.000 2.679*** 
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Table III 
Pre-Analysis with CAMEL Variables 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets) from the estimation of equation 
(14). The dependent variable is post enforcement loan. All the variables are defined in Table 
I. Each observation in the regressions corresponds to a different loan facility. The *, **, *** 
marks denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
  I II III IV 
Risk-weighted capital -2.572*** -2.048 -2.593*** -2.110 
 [-2.790] [-0.770] [-3.135] [-0.504] 
Non-performing loans 7.051*** -1.859 6.468*** -0.008 
 [3.404] [-1.083] [3.142] [-0.003] 
Loan-loss provisions   -4.430** -3.613 
   [-1.965] [-1.268] 
Sharpe ratio   -0.012*** -0.004 
   [-2.918] [-0.622] 
Liquid assets   -0.843** 1.482 
   [-2.387] [0.772] 
Observations 3,043 3,040 3,043 3,040 
Adjusted R-squared 0.154 0.157 0.154 0.157 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan-purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE No Yes No Yes 
Clustered standard errors Bank Bank Bank Bank 
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Table IV 
Enforcement Actions and Syndicated Loan Structure: Baseline Results 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets) from the estimation of equation (13). The 
dependent variable is reported in the second line of the Table and all variables are defined in Table I. Each 
observation in the regressions corresponds to a different loan facility. All regressions include bank and firm 
fixed effects and the standard errors are clustered by firm and bank, as shown in the lower part of the Table. 
The *, **, *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
  I II III IV V 
Dependent variable: Lead lender 
shares (%) 
Deal amount 
held by lead 
($M) 
Lead 
exposure 
(%) 
HHI (%) Number of 
lenders 
Post enforcement loan 4.504*** 26.850*** 4.629*** 3.843*** -0.876** 
 [4.989] [8.263] [5.190] [4.493] [-2.105] 
Firm size -3.439*** 22.680 -2.681* -2.633** 3.675* 
 [-3.009] [0.996] [-1.804] [-2.055] [1.839] 
Profitability 11.728** 114.244*** 14.724*** 9.358 -6.614 
 [2.710] [4.433] [2.859] [1.542] [-1.196] 
Book leverage -6.829*** -69.081 -6.048*** -4.275** 1.683 
 [-4.317] [-1.334] [-3.127] [-2.738] [0.280] 
Z-score -0.357* 3.935*** -0.493*** -0.394*** 0.374** 
 [-1.770] [2.924] [-4.631] [-2.966] [2.360] 
Cash flow volatility -0.990 -41.267 -4.121 -9.049 -7.240 
 [-0.072] [-0.493] [-0.320] [-0.633] [-1.081] 
Tangibility -7.743 59.223 -8.187* -7.384* 1.325 
 [-1.353] [1.443] [-1.773] [-1.798] [0.294] 
Tobin's q  -0.507 -13.467*** 0.169 0.129 0.558 
 [-0.637] [-3.196] [0.192] [0.126] [0.721] 
Firm opacity 0.244** 3.163*** 0.205*** 0.287*** -0.034 
 [2.389] [3.533] [3.281] [3.634] [-0.381] 
Maturity -3.676*** -26.302 -3.226*** -3.505*** 1.223** 
 [-3.003] [-1.397] [-2.833] [-2.988] [2.428] 
Facility amount -0.650** 34.451*** -1.173*** -0.794*** 0.472*** 
 [-2.593] [12.998] [-3.222] [-2.868] [3.114] 
Downgrading 0.544 37.418 0.490 0.435 1.210** 
 [1.095] [1.162] [1.035] [1.177] [2.724] 
Performance pricing -3.364*** -53.254*** -3.520*** -4.328*** 2.902*** 
 [-7.595] [-11.880] [-5.104] [-8.925] [8.487] 
Collateral -1.100 35.956*** -1.380 -0.751 0.947 
 [-0.885] [4.263] [-1.066] [-0.634] [1.529] 
Relationship lending -2.200*** 0.951 -1.663** -2.172*** 1.001*** 
 [-3.710] [0.409] [-2.690] [-3.893] [4.748] 
Observations 3,044 3,044 3,044 3,044 3,044 
Adjusted R-squared 0.727 0.560 0.775 0.736 0.691 
Loan-type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan-purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered standard errors Firm, Bank Firm, Bank Firm, Bank Firm, Bank Firm, Bank 
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Table V 
Enforcement Actions and Syndicated Loan Structure: Sensitivity Tests 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets) from the estimation of equation (13). The dependent variable is the lead lender shares and all variables are defined in Table I. 
Each observation in the regressions corresponds to a different loan facility. In column I we control for bank*firm fixed effects the firm-bank relation and in column II for 
firm*syndicate fixed effects. In column III we conduct the analysis only for participant banks that received an enforcement action. In column IV we control for the top-3 banks in our 
sample. In column V we exclude loans originated for LBOs and M&As. In column VI, the variable Post enforcement loan we use a five-year window around the enforcement action 
(instead of a three-year window). In column VII, we use only the enforcement actions strictly related to the Basel Committee Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (see 
Table I). In column VIII, we add bank-level control variables. In columns IX, X, and XI we control for alternative measures of reputation using the banks’ market shares, Lerner index, 
and credit rating, respectively. All regressions include different type of fixed effects as noted in the lower part of the table and standard errors are clustered by firm and bank. The *, **, 
*** marks denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI 
 Firm-bank 
relation 
Repeated 
syndicate 
members 
EA for 
participants 
Big-3 
banks 
Exclude 
loans for 
LBOs and 
M&As 
Two-year 
window 
Basel-
related 
actions 
only 
Including 
bank 
control 
Market 
structure 
Market 
power 
Credit 
rating 
Post enforcement loan 4.724*** 2.474* 0.541 3.877*** 5.146*** 4.478*** 4.195*** 3.934*** 3.564*** 3.501*** 3.662** 
 
[5.523] [1.860] [1.065] [4.226] [4.892] [7.040] [7.675] [3.926] [4.775] [4.858] [5.227] 
Big-3 banks    -1.813***        
    [-5.394]        
Risk-weighted capital        -277.264**    
        [-2.333]    
Non-performing loans        201.207    
        [1.386]    
Loan-loss provisions        -274.574**    
        [-2.317]    
Sharpe ratio         127.479    
        [0.910]    
Liquid assets        -0.447    
        [-0.856]    
Market shares         0.568   
         [1.733]   
Lerner index          -4.827  
          [-1.147]  
Bank opacity           -1.579* 
           [-3.840] 
Observations 3,044 421 3,301 3,044 2,538 4,823 2,780 3,043 1,171 1,171 2,733 
Adjusted R-squared 0.721 0.574 0.688 0.728 0.772 0.693 0.680 0.728 0.345 0.345 0.666 
Loan and firm controls 
as per Table IV 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Loan-type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan-purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank * Firm FE Yes No No No No No No No No No No 
Firm * Syndicate FE No Yes No No No No No No No No No 
Clustered standard errors Firm, Bank Firm, Bank Firm, Bank Firm, Bank Firm, Bank Firm, Bank Firm, Bank Firm, Bank Firm, Bank Firm, Bank Firm, Bank 
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Table VI 
The Role of Variables Reflecting Informational Asymmetry 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets) from the estimation of 
equation (13). The dependent variable is the lead lender shares, and all variables are 
defined in Table I. Each observation in the regressions corresponds to a different loan 
facility. All regressions include bank and firm fixed effects, and the standard errors are 
clustered by firm and bank, as shown in the last row of the table. The *, **, *** marks 
denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent variable: Lead lender shares (%) 
  I II III 
Post enforcement loan  5.170*** 7.090*** 5.782*** 
 [5.909] [12.009] [5.826] 
Guarantee  3.290   
 [1.684]   
Post enforcement loan * Guarantee  -3.938***   
 [-3.157]   
Collateral  0.177  
  [0.163]  
Post enforcement loan * Collateral  -5.667***  
  [-4.899]  
Letter-of-credit fee    0.008*** 
   [2.912] 
Post enforcement loan * Letter-of-credit fee 
  -0.022*** 
  [-6.692] 
Marginal effect of post enforcement loan 1.231*** 1.422*** 3.615*** 
 [3.711] [3.720] [4.461] 
Observations 2,559 2,559 2,559 
Adjusted R-squared 0.658 0.659 0.657 
Firm control characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Loan control characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Loan type FE Yes Yes Yes 
Loan-purpose FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered standard errors Firm, Bank Firm, Bank Firm, Bank 
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Table VII 
The Role of Variables Reflecting Monitoring 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets) from the estimation of equation (13). 
The dependent variable is the lead lender shares and all variables are defined in Table I. Each 
observation in the regressions corresponds to a different loan facility. All regressions include 
bank and firm fixed effects, and the standard errors are clustered by firm and bank, as shown 
in the last row of the Table. The *, **, *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent variable: Lead lender shares (%) 
  I II III 
Post enforcement loan  7.861*** 8.288*** 7.967*** 
 [5.926] [9.120] [4.068] 
Performance pricing -2.412***   
 [-5.664]   
Post enforcement loan * Performance pricing -5.320***   
 [-6.098]   
General covenants   0.228  
  [0.772]  
Post enforcement loan * General covenants  -1.179***  
  [-5.935]  
Relationship lending   -2.588*** 
   [-4.881] 
Post enforcement loan * Relationship lending   -4.254** 
   [-2.705] 
Marginal effect of post enforcement loan 2.540*** 3.573*** 3.712*** 
 [3.777] [3.701] [5.841] 
Observations 2,559 2,559 2,559 
Adjusted R-squared 0.658 0.658 0.658 
Firm control characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Loan control characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Loan type FE Yes Yes Yes 
Loan-purpose FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered standard errors Firm, Bank Firm, Bank Firm, Bank 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table A.I 
Enforcement Actions and Syndicated Loan Structure: Further Robustness Tests 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets) from the estimation of equation (13). The dependent variable is reported in the second line of the Table and all variables 
are defined in Table I. Each observation in the regressions corresponds to a different loan facility. Column I uses simple OLS without any fixed effects and in columns II-V we 
sequentially add fixed effects as shown in the lower part of the table. Panel B replicates the results of column I with the different dependent variables as shown in the second line 
of the table. The *, **, *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Panel A Panel B 
  Lead lender shares (%) 
Deal amount 
held by lead 
($M) 
Lead 
exposure 
(%) 
HHI (%) 
Number of 
lenders 
 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX 
Post enforcement loan 8.016*** 8.016*** 8.212*** 7.722*** 7.893*** 51.709*** 9.430*** 7.600*** -1.485*** 
 
[7.446] [7.448] [7.711] [7.372] [5.320] [4.093] [9.275] [7.529] [-4.345] 
Firm size -1.410*** -1.419*** -1.418*** -1.529*** -1.340*** 25.806*** -1.514*** -1.456*** 1.879*** 
 
[-3.704] [-3.740] [-3.557] [-3.834] [-5.072] [6.455] [-4.647] [-3.941] [3.920] 
Profitability -20.658*** -20.589*** -18.425*** -16.783*** -17.889*** -34.504 -22.074*** -21.684*** -2.937 
 
[-3.253] [-3.239] [-2.904] [-2.634] [-2.853] [-0.997] [-3.624] [-3.722] [-1.445] 
Book leverage -1.431 -1.499 -1.911 -0.594 -1.094 84.066*** -2.043 -1.458 3.740*** 
 
[-0.667] [-0.701] [-0.894] [-0.276] [-0.798] [2.614] [-1.097] [-0.751] [2.987] 
Z-score 0.518** 0.522** 0.497** 0.556** 0.449* 3.757*** 0.470** 0.527** -0.104 
 
[2.213] [2.218] [2.078] [2.352] [2.025] [2.897] [2.041] [2.307] [-1.456] 
Cash flow volatility 51.663*** 51.955*** 49.964*** 55.275*** 54.841*** 34.536 52.869*** 44.637*** 4.935 
 
[3.790] [3.803] [3.661] [4.207] [2.837] [0.596] [3.804] [3.315] [0.918] 
Tangibility 2.053* 2.102* 1.946 2.344* 2.428*** 2.008 1.872 1.495 -1.722** 
 
[1.676] [1.714] [1.538] [1.840] [3.720] [0.220] [1.603] [1.288] [-2.428] 
Tobin's q  -0.708 -0.718 -0.745 -1.043* -0.763 -3.465 -0.312 -0.663 0.381** 
 
[-1.209] [-1.220] [-1.243] [-1.711] [-1.355] [-1.003] [-0.544] [-1.165] [2.056] 
Firm opacity 0.077 0.077 0.088 0.075 0.112*** 1.566** -0.008 0.043 0.022 
 
[1.257] [1.260] [1.435] [1.225] [3.025] [2.405] [-0.144] [0.759] [0.452] 
Maturity -4.898*** -4.957*** -5.210*** -5.913*** -5.556*** -3.948 -3.677*** -4.574*** 0.700*** 
 
[-7.951] [-7.930] [-7.879] [-8.568] [-4.268] [-0.460] [-6.411] [-7.877] [2.630] 
Facility amount -4.521*** -4.499*** -4.271*** -4.370*** -4.152*** 31.399*** -4.677*** -4.669*** 1.726*** 
 
[-11.078] [-10.955] [-10.549] [-10.824] [-8.309] [6.665] [-12.216] [-11.865] [6.618] 
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Downgrading 0.632 0.633 0.541 0.492 0.372 14.868 0.338 0.747 1.358*** 
 
[0.981] [0.983] [0.826] [0.749] [1.062] [1.438] [0.601] [1.260] [3.035] 
Performance pricing -2.082*** -2.023*** -2.380*** -2.453*** -2.458*** -44.690*** -3.044*** -3.253*** 2.959*** 
 
[-3.087] [-2.945] [-3.254] [-3.380] [-4.555] [-5.336] [-5.076] [-5.156] [7.257] 
Collateral 0.354 0.294 0.789 0.331 0.201 29.272*** -0.393 0.725 1.058** 
 
[0.518] [0.419] [1.095] [0.454] [0.246] [2.998] [-0.629] [1.124] [2.346] 
Relationship lending -2.052*** -2.049*** -2.333*** -2.370*** -2.260*** -20.984*** -1.971*** -2.391*** 1.196*** 
 
[-3.335] [-3.330] [-3.811] [-3.925] [-3.975] [-2.652] [-3.494] [-4.181] [3.597] 
Observations 3,044 3,044 3,044 3,044 3,044 3,044 3,044 3,044 3,044 
Adjusted R-squared 0.318 0.317 0.325 0.341 0.356 0.144 0.356 0.353 0.273 
Loan-type FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Loan-purpose FE No No Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Year FE No No No Yes Yes No No No No 
Bank FE No No No No Yes No No No No 
Clustered standard errors Firm, Bank Firm, Bank Firm, Bank Firm, Bank Firm, Bank Firm, Bank Firm, Bank Firm, Bank Firm, Bank 
 
